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INTRODUCTION 
Then do the same with the virtues. Even if they are many and 
various, yet at least they all have some common character 
which makes them virtues. That is what ought to be kept in 
view by anyone who answers the question, “What is virtue?” 
Plato, Meno, 72c-d (W.K.C. Guthrie, trans.) 
 
What is arbitration? Do all forms of arbitration have a “common charac-
ter”—for example, that they are designed to handle only private disputes? Is 
this what makes arbitration categorically different from a court? When proce-
dures sometimes found in more public forms of adjudication—discovery, rea-
soned awards, and appellate review—become more common in arbitration, at 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Professorial Research Associate, 
School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London (Jan.–Aug. 2018). I thank Jean 
Sternlight for extremely helpful and perceptive feedback on earlier drafts, and the Nevada 
Law Journal for inviting me to submit this reply. 
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what point do they threaten to turn it into something it is not or was not meant 
to be? 
These are the tough, metaphysical questions lurking in the shadows of Pro-
fessor Deborah Hensler and Ms. Damira Khatam’s thought-provoking new arti-
cle, Re-inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-
Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudica-
tion. The questions themselves are fascinating and have intrigued me for many 
years now, for they speak to what Ludwig Wittgenstein referred to as a human 
“craving for generality.”1 Reading the article gave me the opportunity to grap-
ple with them in more detail, which in turn took me on a long and at times chal-
lenging intellectual journey. This reply documents what I discovered and what I 
take to be the implications for the authors’ bold and ambitious project. 
I agree in large part with the authors that arbitration today faces something 
of a legitimacy crisis. For example, I agree that arbitration as we know it is 
generally not open to the public, generally lacks published records and deci-
sions, and relies on private decision-makers who are not publicly appointed. I 
also agree that while this private format may have been suitable for purely 
commercial claims between relatively evenly-matched disputants, at some 
point arbitration increasingly came to be used for disputes with “significant 
public policy dimensions,”2 such as statutory employment discrimination 
claims in the United States or claims of expropriation by private investors 
against foreign sovereigns. These newer uses raised real concerns about unvet-
ted private citizens deciding far-reaching cases, about the importance of trans-
parency and accountability, about access to justice for weaker parties, and 
about moneyed interests co-opting the rule of law. 
The real question is what to do about it. My own view is that arbitration is 
adapting—and should further adapt—to address these concerns. For example, 
domestic United States arbitration today is a far cry from the old-fashioned, ad 
hoc process that the authors have in mind: It is regulated in specialized sectors 
such as the financial services industry, largely overseen by institutional provid-
ers such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA),3 and dominated by 
                                                        
1  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS: PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR THE 
“PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS” 17 (2d ed. 1969). 
2  Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 386 (2018). 
3  For example, among other things the AAA requires all employment arbitration awards to 
be published and for the provider of goods or services to pay all administrative fees and arbi-
trator remuneration in consumer cases. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 39(b), at 21 (2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/de 
fault/files/Employment%20Arbitration%20Rules%20and%20Mediation%20Procedures%20
Nov%2001%2C%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7HP-R2WV]; AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION RULES R. 43, at 27 (2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer 
%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UQ6-G6QU]. 
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lawyer-advocates and arbitrators for whom reasoned decisions according to law 
have become the norm. When “re-invented” in these ways, arbitration is not on-
ly adequate for the vast majority of consumer and employment disputes it al-
ready handles, it may well be indispensable given the significant caseload pres-
sures on overburdened courts.4 
By contrast, Hensler and Khatam resist arbitration’s adaptation. They are 
led to do so in large part, I shall argue, because of the implicit stance they have 
taken on the questions I raised at the beginning of this essay. Hensler and Kha-
tam do not just believe that claims brought in arbitration have historically been 
of a (more or less) private nature; instead, they think there is something inher-
ently private about arbitration itself, such that public disputes simply cannot be 
arbitrated without “destroy[ing]” the process along the way.5 And when discov-
ery or appellate review becomes increasingly common in arbitration, rather 
than see the march of progress towards better adjudicative procedure, they see a 
quintessentially private forum metastasizing into a quasi-public one. 
The metaphysics of arbitration is not new, of course. A case in point is Jus-
tice Stevens’s dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.:6 “Like any other mechanism . . . arbitration will only succeed if it is realis-
tically limited to tasks it is capable of performing well—the prompt and inex-
pensive resolution of essentially contractual disputes between commercial part-
ners.”7 The Court often relied on this type of judgment “centered on the nature 
of arbitration”8 to explain why disputes involving public-regarding federal stat-
utes such as Title VII were not in fact amenable to arbitration. This, in turn, 
helped inform important policy debates about arbitration’s limitations and 
strengths as a dispute resolution forum.9 
Hensler and Khatam’s article can be seen as taking up the mantle of this 
longer tradition of teleological thinking in arbitration—a tradition whose roots 
can be traced as far back as Plato and some of the greatest thinkers in Western 
Civilization. The ‘big questions’ it raises have given me an opportunity to re-
visit what I thought I knew about arbitration and courts. But they also under-
                                                        
4  See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION—A 
GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS 11, 13 (2008); Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness Act: 
Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 455, 464–65 
(2007). 
5  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 386. 
6  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
7  Id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This passage was quoted with approval in an earlier 
draft of Hensler and Khatam’s article but was subsequently removed. 
8  14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 (2009). 
9  As the Court famously observed, “the informality of arbitral procedure . . . enables it to 
function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution,” but that 
“[t]his same characteristic . . . makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution 
of Title VII issues than the federal courts.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
58 (1974). 
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scored for me some of the difficulties associated with the metaphysical enter-
prise. In the final analysis, my disagreement with the authors has more to do 
with their embrace of that enterprise than with their account of the problem or 
their call to action. 
I. WHAT IS ARBITRATION? 
At first glance, domestic United States arbitration, international commer-
cial arbitration (ICA), and investor-state arbitration seem like very different 
practices, each with their own set of players and legal frameworks. To be sure, 
there are overlapping “family resemblances”10 among them, such as that breach 
of contract and other private law claims have tended to predominate, or that the 
proceedings and the final award need not be made public. But does this mean 
that privateness is just a frequent feature of arbitration in these contexts, or does 
it mean that privateness is part of arbitration’s DNA? 
Hensler and Khatam seem to believe the latter. For example, they argue 
that when public disputes increasingly come to be arbitrated, it is not just that 
the balance of public and private claims has shifted; instead, it represents arbi-
tration’s “mutat[ion]” into something for which “the procedure arguably was 
not originally intended.”11 In other words, they turn the phenotype of private-
ness—a property shared by many arbitrations—into a veritable genotype of 
something called “arbitration.” In so doing, they are led to overlook or discount 
the many contexts in which arbitration was decidedly public—contexts that 
ought at least to make us question whether it is possible to essentialize arbitra-
tion in this way. 
A. Constructed Categories 
Hensler and Khatam’s argument coheres a great deal around the way they 
have chosen to construct the category “arbitration” in contradistinction to “pub-
lic adjudication.” These categories are not unproblematically ‘out there’ wait-
ing to be discovered; instead, they are constituted in ways that betray varying 
normative assumptions and commitments. For example, the public or private 
nature of “arbitration” will depend on what processes one deems worthy of this 
appellation. Hensler and Khatam are probably correct to think of arbitration as 
private if they are principally concerned with domestic United States arbitration 
in the early twentieth century. But not if they were thinking of state-to-state ar-
bitration. Indeed, it doesn’t get more public than a dispute between two sover-
eign states over boundaries or natural resources—disputes that can affect thou-
                                                        
10  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 
3d ed. 1986). 
11  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 386. 
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sands if not millions of people.12 Tribunals hearing such disputes generally 
produce lengthy reasoned awards of one hundred pages or more that are typi-
cally published.13 Some of them have been widely cited and have played an im-
portant role shaping public international law in specialized domains.14 
There is no neutral or natural reason why state-to-state arbitration should 
have been omitted from Hensler and Khatam’s account of arbitration.15 After 
all, the procedure used in state-to-state arbitration is more or less identical to 
the procedure used in domestic United States arbitration: Arbitrators are chosen 
by the parties and need not be publicly appointed (for example, by a standing 
international body); there are no rigid rules of evidence; there is no right of 
public access; the rules of procedure are typically informal and do not provide 
for pre-hearing discovery other than the exchange of documents; there is no 
right of substantive merits review. To take an obvious example, the same 1976 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have been (and continue to be) used in both ad 
hoc private commercial and state-to-state disputes.16 This begs the question: If 
                                                        
12  See, e.g., Rann of Kutch (India v. Pak.), 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 1, 7 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1968); Island 
of Palmas Case (Neth., U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Alabama Claims 
Case (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 127 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1872). 
13  Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State 
Arbitration since 1945, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 110 (1993) (“[I]nter-State arbitrations in 
which not even the award is published remain exceptional.”). State-to-state arbitration 
awards can be found in International Law Reports, in the United Nations Reports of Interna-
tional Arbitration Awards, and on the PCA’s website among others. See also chapters 1–6 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO 
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY (1898). 
14  As Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury explain, 
[t]he mass of arbitral awards dating back to the Jay Treaty substantially created international law 
on State responsibility for injury to aliens (including the local remedies rule and nationality of 
claims). Other sources, such as diplomatic practice, played a complementary role, but the de-
tailed rules evolved through arbitral decisions. . . . Again, arbitral awards have played a crucial 
role in the creation of international law on acquisition of territory and boundary delimitation. . . . 
[T]he nature of the subject-matter—the uniqueness of each geographical and historical situa-
tion—meant that arbitral decisions were necessary for the creation of general rules. . . . Similar-
ly, on questions of treaty interpretation, the nature of the subject-matter gave arbitral decisions a 
central role in the evolution of the law. 
Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 13, at 131–32. Gary Born has likewise observed that the PCA 
has produced “a handful of well-reasoned awards that have played a material role in the de-
velopment of customary international law.” Gary Born, A New Generation of International 
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 797 (2012). 
15  For instance, it falls squarely within their definition of arbitration as a “binding adjudica-
tion of a dispute by private decision-makers outside a public court system.” Hensler & Kha-
tam, supra note 2, at 387. 
16  E.g., Jack J. Coe Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration: An 
Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 143, 146–47 (2002) 
(observing that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have “been the basis of many institutional 
rule sets, whether intended for private disputes or the more exotic mixed disputes and state-
to-state proceedings”). The 2012 Arbitration Rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
which are substantially similar to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, may be used in state-to-
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substantially the same basic arbitral process has and can be employed in state-
to-state arbitrations that affect the public interest on a national and even inter-
national scale, why can it not be used or adapted in the domestic sphere to han-
dle employment discrimination and consumer protection claims? For unlike 
claims brought by or against a state, the latter are in the nature of private dis-
putes between private individuals (albeit ones that affect the public interest in 
significant ways). 
Once we accept, as we must, that state-to-state arbitration is also a type of 
arbitration, it becomes easier to see how the authors could have drawn their 
boundaries very differently. For example, state-to-state arbitration arguably has 
more in common with international courts than it does with domestic United 
States arbitration. Consider what distinguishes the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA), an arbitral body, from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
first truly international judicial body (established only decades after the 
PCA).17 Both were created by an international treaty,18 which is essentially a 
contract between sovereign nations. Neither exercises compulsory jurisdiction 
as a default matter, which is to say that states must specifically consent to sub-
mit their disputes.19 From the very beginning there has been a significant over-
                                                                                                                                 
state, investor-state, and private commercial disputes. See PCA Arbitration Rules, 
PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/documents/pca-conventions-and-rules/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9LHY-CYQF] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (stating that the PCA Arbitration Rules 
2012 may be used in “disputes involving various combinations of states, state entities, inter-
national organizations, and private parties”). 
17  The PCA was established in 1899. Although the ICJ was not established until 1946, its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of Justice, was established in 1922. PERMANENT CT. ARB., 
https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/ [https://perma.cc/2NX3-K3WN] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018); 
INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/history [https://perma.cc/WMK5-HCJK] (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2018). 
18  The PCA was established by the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/1899-Convention-for-the-Pacific-Settlement-of-
International-Disputes.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q39V-M7TB] [hereinafter First Hague Conven-
tion]. The ICJ was established by the UN Charter, which is itself a type of international trea-
ty. See U.N. Charter art. 7, ¶ 1. 
19  First Hague Convention, supra note 18, art. 24; 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes art. 31, Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 1803, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/1907-Convention-for-the-Pacific-Settlement-of-
International-Disputes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT6A-MB7Y] [hereinafter Second Hague Con-
vention]; PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 1 ¶ 1. In the case of the 
ICJ, states may give their consent either before a particular dispute arises, in the form of a 
treaty obligation to submit all disputes under the treaty to the ICJ, or afterwards. Statute of 
the International Court of Justice art. 36 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S 933. 
They may also consent to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction over all legal disputes “in rela-
tion to any other state accepting the same obligation.” Id. art. 36 ¶ 2. As of the present writ-
ing, 86 out of the 193 U.N. member states have done so. See Declarations Recognizing as 
Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Under Art. 36, Paragraph 2, 
of the Statute of the Court (Oct. 15, 1946) https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src 
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lap in the types of claims that both forums may hear; indeed, states are known 
to forum shop between international arbitral and judicial tribunals depending on 
their preferences for confidentiality, control in the selection of adjudicators, 
cost, and other factors.20 The decision-makers are not mutually exclusive in the 
sense that nothing prevents an ICJ judge from sitting as a PCA arbitrator,21 and 
the final award or judgment must be supported by reasons.22 In neither forum is 
there a right of appellate review.23 
As far as I can tell the only real difference between the PCA and the ICJ is 
that (i) final judgments of the ICJ must be made public while those of the PCA 
need not,24 and (ii) the ICJ has a standing body of full-time adjudicators where-
as the parties can choose virtually any individual to arbitrate a case pending at 
the PCA.25 This means that judicial bodies such as the ICJ are more likely to 
develop a jurisprudence constante to help enunciate norms and guide future 
decision-making. But couldn’t the PCA require all arbitral awards to be pub-
lished—as most of them are anyhow—without losing its character as an arbitral 
body?26 Couldn’t it likewise require arbitrators to be chosen from within the 
membership of the Court, as was anyhow provided in the original 1899 Hague 
Convention?27 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) would seem to be an ob-
vious case in point. The procedure before the IUSCT is based on a modified 
version of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.28 But the IUSCT is com-
                                                                                                                                 
=IND&mtdsg_no=I-4&chapter=1&clang=_en#8 [https://perma.cc/TCQ6-PZ2H] (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2018). 
20  See Natalie Klein, Who Litigates and Why, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 584 (Cesare PR Romano et al. eds., 2014); Shigeru Oda, Further Thoughts on 
the Chambers Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 556, 558 
(1988) (describing the potential for such forum-shopping in the Gulf of Maine Chambers 
proceeding at the ICJ). 
21  ICJ judges have on more than one occasion served as ad hoc arbitrators in state-to-state 
disputes. For example, at the time of their appointment on 22 July 1971, all five arbitrators in 
The Beagle Channel case were judges of the ICJ. Compare The Beagle Channel (Arg. v. 
Chile), 21 R.I.A.A. 53, 61 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1977), with INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/all-members [https://perma.cc/R6WZ-ELZE] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
22  These two similarities are in sharp contrast to the practice in domestic U.S. arbitration. 
See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (D. Del. 2012), aff’d, 733 
F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013). 
23  Compare PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 34 with Statute of the 
International Court of Justice arts. 56, 60, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S 933. 
24  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 58, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S 933; Rules of the Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs., arts. 94–95. There is, however, 
no requirement under either the ICJ Statute or the ICJ Rules for documents or proceedings 
other than the final award, such as oral hearings or written pleadings, to be made public. 
25  Compare PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 10 with Statute of the 
International Court of Justice arts. 3, 16, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S 933. 
26  See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 13, at 110. 
27  First Hague Convention, supra note 18, art. 24. 
28  CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 16–20 (1998). 
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posed of a standing body of judges appointed for fixed terms and, unlike a 
commercial arbitral institution, it gives parties little say in the composition of 
each tribunal and it requires all decisions to be made public. Despite these mod-
ifications to “classic” arbitration, the IUSCT is still generally understood to be 
a form of arbitration29 and its awards are enforceable under the New York Con-
vention.30 If the arbitration can succeed in this context even while incorporating 
many of the features traditionally associated with courts, why can it not like-
wise succeed in the domains that Hensler and Khatam have identified? 
State-to-state arbitration therefore explodes the idea that arbitrating public 
disputes is something of a category mistake, one that “blurs” the otherwise 
bright “line between private and public dispute resolution.”31 Excluding it from 
their construction of arbitration helps the authors exaggerate the discontinuities 
between arbitration and public adjudication and helps them elide arbitration’s 
important public law lineage. 
B. Is Arbitration Essentially Private? 
Even within the three domains they identify, Hensler and Khatam under-
play the extent to which public disputes have figured in each of them. For ex-
ample, most commentators would consider investor-state arbitration to be a 
form of quasi-public arbitration.32 Since its inception, investor-state arbitration 
as we know it today has largely been a creature of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and routinely involves claims based on public international law. Hensler 
and Khatam make investor-state arbitration look like a mongrelized private fo-
rum because they portray it as an outgrowth of international commercial arbi-
tration, which is certainly one way of looking at it.33 But by changing one’s 
perspective just the opposite story could be told: With the rise of BITs, the 
same basic arbitration procedure that had been used for centuries in public dis-
putes between sovereign states became accessible to private investors pursuing 
                                                        
29  E.g., Jon A. Stanley, Comment, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory 
Takings as Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 349, 355 n.25 (2001). 
30  See, e.g., Michael Durgavich, Comment, Resolving Disputes Arising Out of the Persian 
Gulf War: Independent Enforceability of International Agreements to Arbitrate, 22 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 389, 422 (1992) (“[T]he New York Convention applies to decisions rendered by 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.”). 
31  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 386. 
32  See Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different Are 
They Today?: The Lalive Lecture 2012, 28 ARB. INT’L. 577, 579 (2012); Anthea Roberts, 
Divergence between Investment and Commercial Arbitration, in AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 106TH ANNUAL MEETING 297, 298 (2012); José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-
State Arbitration ‘Public’? 1 (Inst. for Int’l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 2016/6, 2016). 
33  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 409–13. Investor-state arbitrations prior to 1960 
were often brought under concession agreements and were likely understood by all partici-
pants involved as a type of ICA. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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both public- and private-law claims against a state. A case in point is the PCA, 
which was established in 1899 to hear inter-state disputes. The PCA received 
its first investor-state case in 2003.34 In proceedings before the PCA the same 
or similar rules of arbitral procedure may be used for both types of disputes.35 
International commercial and domestic arbitration, too, have seen their 
share of public disputes for quite some time. For example, disputes between in-
vestors and states or state-owned entities were handled in private ad hoc and 
institutional ICA well before the developments Hensler and Khatam identify.36 
Several nineteenth century English acts regulating the power of condemnation 
and eminent domain by public authorities provided for voluntary arbitration to 
determine the amount of compensation owed.37 In 1915, Samuel Rosenbaum 
reported to the American Judicature Society that “[u]nder these [English] Acts 
arbitrations take place in great numbers every year all over the Kingdom, as 
practically every condemnation proceeds in this way,” and that “[a]part from 
the fact that the award must be made within 21 days after the arbitrators are all 
appointed, there are no further differences from ordinary [commercial] arbitra-
tions.”38 Going further back in time to Elizabethan England and beyond, Derek 
Roebuck has meticulously documented the sheer ubiquity of arbitration in its 
                                                        
34  The PCA’s website allows one to view all cases that it has coded as “investor-state,” 
whether or not still pending. See PCA Case Repository, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www. 
pcacases.com/web/advancedsearch/ [https://perma.cc/3QKY-86KB] (select “Investment Ar-
bitration” in “Type of Case” drop down menu; then run search; then sort by “Date of com-
mencement of proceeding”) (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
35  The PCA Arbitration Rules may be used in investor-state and state-to-state arbitration. 
PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 4. Similarly, the IUSCT, which was 
established by Iran and the US to hear claims not just between the two state parties but also 
between private citizens of one state and the other state party, applies a modified version of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to both types of disputes. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, 
supra note 28, at 16–17; see also supra text accompanying note 28. 
36  E.g., Born, supra note 14, at 827 (observing that “by the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury,” ICA became the preferred method of resolving claims between private investors and 
states). The ad hoc arbitration between Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the former Soviet Union 
over gold mine investments in Siberia is perhaps one of the earliest examples. See generally 
Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Gov-
ernment, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 31, 42 (1950) (reprinting the “Text of the Award in the Lena 
Goldfields, Ltd., Arbitration, September 3, 1930”). Nussbaum reports that the original award 
was published in the Times of London in 1930. Id. at 31, 42. According to some estimates, 
approximately 10 percent of the ICC’s docket currently involves a state party, and the com-
mercial arbitration rules of private providers such as the ICC and the LCIA are increasingly 
being used in investor-state arbitration. Böckstiegel, supra note 32, at 581. 
37  See, e.g., Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 70, §§ 20–21 
(Eng.); Public Health Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, §§ 179–81 (Eng.); Elementary Educa-
tion Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75, § 20 (Eng.); Railways Clauses Act 1863, 26 & 27 Vict., 
c. 92, § 8 (Eng.); Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, 8 Vict., c. 18, §§ 23–37 (Eng.). 
Note that under English law at the time, the arbitrator could state a legal question for deter-
mination by the courts. See infra note 100. 
38  SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, A REPORT ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 33–34 
(1916). 
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private and public forms. Contrary to popular belief, disputes between parties 
with vastly unequal bargaining power,39 such as noblemen and serfs or employ-
ers and wage earners, appear to have been routinely submitted to private arbi-
tration at least as far back as the late middle ages.40 Nor was it uncommon for 
serious felonies and other matters of public law to be arbitrated—matters that 
have not been arbitrable for quite some time in the United States and likely 
won’t be for the foreseeable future.41 Such proceedings were often highly pub-
lic affairs, with the award being celebrated “by a dramatic public ritual, [and] 
large numbers of witnesses in effect serving to enforce future peace, if only by 
peer pressure.”42 Public officials were known to sit as arbitrators.43 Reasoned 
                                                        
39  Roebuck contends that Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Council, which he describes as a form of 
public arbitration, intervened in cases involving a stark imbalance of wealth between dispu-
tants. DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION 119 (2015). This was in line with 
the Council’s mandate to prioritize cases involving the poor, who typically did not resort to 
the courts. Id. 
40  Id. at 194 (“Disputes about wages and similar issues between employer and employee, or 
master and apprentice, were the regular stuff of private arbitration [in Elizabethan Eng-
land].”); DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 87 (2013) 
(“[I]t is clear not only that employment disputes were arbitrated but that even [criminal] 
prosecutions under the Statute of Labourers . . . could be substantively disposed of by arbi-
tration.”); Edward Powell, Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late Middle Ages: The 
Alexander Prize Essay, in 33 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 49, 53 (1983) (“Relations 
between master and apprentice or employer and wage-earner might also be regulated by ar-
bitration, and even, on occasion, those between landlord and tenant or lord and serf.”); cf. 
Margo Todd, ‘For Eschewing of Trouble and Exorbitant Expense’: Arbitration in the Early 
Modern British Isles, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 7 (2016) (stating that “[t]he history of binding 
arbitration in British customary law is very long, and in scope, very broad,” and that arbitra-
tion was used “across a broad range of social estates, from craftsmen to lords, alewives to 
merchant princes. . . .”). It may also come as a surprise to learn that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements appear to have been used with some regularity in a variety of contexts, including 
insurance policies in the sixteenth century and lending transactions within the Jewish com-
munity in the thirteenth. See ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 39, at 
3–4, 303–05; ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra at 248. 
41  ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 40, at 69 (argu-
ing that in the High Middle Ages in Britain, arbitration was used by the “widest range of par-
ties to almost any kind of dispute”); Powell, supra note 40, at 52 (noting that arbitration was 
often used in the late middle ages in Britain for disputes involving “leading magnates or the 
great urban and ecclesiastical corporations of the realm.”). 
42  Todd, supra note 40, at 15. As Todd explains: 
Publicity per se tended to ensure that the settlement would be kept, since violating an agreement 
witnessed by the whole neighborhood would bring charges of duplicity and undermine reputa-
tion. If arbitrators determined that one party was at fault in a dispute, that person could be made 
formally to process through a town, often to the place where he had offended or to the home of 
the party he had harmed, there to kneel and apologize, clasp hands or kiss the plaintiff, and drink 
his health. 
Id. 
43  ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 39, at 298 (“The Government 
made frequent use of judges as arbitrators, deliberately taking matters away from the courts 
. . . .”); ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 40, at 371 
(“It was common to appoint judges as arbitrators.”); Todd, supra note 40, at 10 (referring to 
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awards were issued.44 There is even evidence that arbitration forums such as 
Piepowder Courts applied and developed their own (unpublished) precedents, 
some of which may have exerted significant influence on the development of 
English common law in the area of warranties.45 
Even when arbitration was used in these public ways to resolve very public 
disputes, the same basic procedure that Hensler and Khatam associate with a 
private forum was followed.46 For example, the parties had to consent to arbi-
tration; they chose the arbitrators; although there were few rigid rules of proce-
dure, proofs were submitted and witnesses were called to testify and to be 
cross-examined; an emphasis was placed on deciding cases based on justice 
and equity but with more efficiency and finality than would be expected in 
court; awards were often recorded, some in astonishing detail; and there was 
occasionally even a procedure for appeal and rehearing.47 
If more or less the same arbitration process has historically been used to re-
solve a wide variety of disputes affecting the public interest, it suggests at min-
imum that there is no inherent or obvious impediment to using or adapting arbi-
tration today for similar disputes of a public character. To the extent there are 
outer limits—and I agree there are—more work will be needed to explain 
where those limits lie and why they are hard stops rather than sticky defaults. 
The point is just that there is nothing natural or axiomatic about Hensler and 
Khatam’s claim that arbitration’s telos is to resolve only private disputes “un-
likely to have much public impact,” through a process “subject to little external 
scrutiny” or procedural formality.48 The persuasiveness of this claim, I have ar-
gued, will largely depend on what forms of arbitration one privileges over oth-
ers—that is, on how the category of arbitration is constructed. 
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH REINVENTION? 
The most striking claim to originality of Hensler and Khatam’s article is 
that there is an important development common across three disparate arbitral 
domains that has so far escaped notice because scholars of arbitration have 
                                                                                                                                 
the arbitration of a dispute between the Bishop of Ely and Lord Hatton, which was presided 
over ca. 1677 by the Lord Chancellor and Chief Justice North, among others). 
44  ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 39, at 76–80. 
45  In a fascinating work-in-progress, my colleague Robert Brain argues that prior to the rise 
of assumpsit in the 1600s, contract-based warranty law—at that time part of the Law Mer-
chant—evolved primarily through a private system of arbitral precedents that stretched as far 
back as the thirteenth century. Some records of those arbitral tribunals have been preserved 
to this day. See Robert Brain, The Common Law Development of Warranties of Quality 14–
15 (July 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
46  E.g., ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 39, at 67 (“Whether the 
arbitration was private or public, the parties expected the arbitrators to follow much the same 
procedure.”). 
47  See id. at 67–86. 
48  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 393, 401. 
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tended to work in silos.49 That development is as follows: As more and more 
non-contractual, non-commercial disputes came within arbitration’s scope, the 
need to “shore up the legitimacy of arbitrations”50 caused a parallel judicializa-
tion of the process. For example, in the domestic United States sphere, arbitra-
tion “morphed from a private, informal, streamlined dispute resolution process, 
subject to little external scrutiny, to a much more formal and quite a bit more 
public—and arguably more expensive and time consuming—procedure that in-
creasingly resembles litigation.”51 A similar transformation can be seen in ICA, 
where “parties have imported American-style discovery, including voluminous 
document exchange, interrogatories, and depositions into what was traditionally 
envisioned as a streamlined presentation of evidence followed by swift deci-
sion-making.”52 Likewise, the authors argue that as the number of claims 
brought by private investors against states multiplied, new rules were promul-
gated that now require the final award and important filings to be published, 
and allow members of the public to attend oral hearings and submit amicus cu-
riae briefs.53 
Some scholars would argue that the differences among these domains are 
already so great as to elude meaningful comparison.54 The fact that Hensler and 
Khatam have managed to make those comparisons nonetheless is a testament to 
their acuity and ability to think outside the box. Moreover, their account of ar-
bitration’s reinvention into the “new litigation” is refreshingly novel, as few 
scholars before them have attempted to explain this as a response to the ex-
panding scope of arbitrability (as opposed, say, to the stubborn habits of law-
yers or meddlesome national courts).55 I think the authors are more or less cor-
                                                        
49  Id. at 381. 
50  Id. at 386. 
51  Id. at 393. 
52  Id. at 384–85. 
53  Id. at 386 (citing G.A. Res. 68/109, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based 
Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitra 
tion/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU2C-YERX] 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018)). 
54  Jan Paulsson, for instance, has argued that “[i]nternational arbitration is no more a ‘type’ 
of arbitration than a sea elephant is a type of elephant. True, one reminds us of the other. Yet 
the essential difference of their nature is so great that their similarities are largely illusory.” 
Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, 2 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1, 
1 (2008). 
55  See, e.g., Eric Bergsten, Professor of Law Emeritus, Pace L. Sch., The Americanization of 
International Arbitration, Address at the International Law Students Association Conference 
at Pace Law School (Oct. 27–29, 2005), in 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 289, 301 (2006) (noting a 
“trend in international arbitration is to move towards the American style of litigation” as a 
result of which “procedural disputes have multiplied, jurisdictional objections are common, 
and cross-examination is prevalent.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Tak-
ing Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 386 (2009). In other 
countries such as India, the blame has fallen on interventionist national courts, the lack of 
robust institutional oversight, or an ingrained culture of public adjudication whereby retired 
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rect, too, about the ways in which arbitration has actually morphed over time in 
all three contexts. 
My question is, what’s wrong with this metamorphosis? To be sure, some 
aspects of arbitration’s reinvention have been less positive than others. For ex-
ample, when lawyers needlessly complicate the process with the same full-bore 
discovery and motion practice they are accustomed to in court, arbitration can 
lose many of the advantages commonly ascribed to it. But if the influx of new 
claims involving significant public interests has led stakeholders to insist on 
more transparency and formality in order to improve legitimacy or accuracy in 
adjudication, why isn’t this the natural process of adaptation? 
I think Hensler and Khatam’s response here is to say that arbitration’s rein-
vention in these ways somehow contradicts arbitration’s fundamental nature or 
its place in the order of things. To them, reinvention is unnatural—akin to a 
“mutat[ion]”56 that ends up producing an entirely “new form of dispute resolu-
tion,” one that is no longer truly arbitration.57 For example, the authors view 
certain procedural accoutrements that have become increasingly common in 
arbitration, such as discovery, reasoned awards, or appellate review, as unique 
hallmarks of litigation rather than as generic procedures for use in adjudicative 
processes generally. Alternatively, they view these accoutrements as somehow 
defeating the very purpose or raison d’être of arbitration.58 As a result, they ar-
gue for “returning domestic commercial arbitration to the purely commercial 
sphere . . . [so as to clarify] the boundary between private arbitration and public 
adjudication and preserve each for its most appropriate uses.”59 They make a 
similar recommendation as to investor-state arbitration and would presumably 
do the same as to ICA but for the fact that the problem is not as acute in that 
context and, as a practical matter, there is currently no real judicial alternative 
to arbitrating international commercial disputes.60 
A. Are Some Procedures Hallmarks of Litigation and Only Litigation? 
Because there are few limits on the design of an arbitral process, scholars 
have typically distinguished arbitration from litigation on a limited set of 
grounds such as confidentiality, greater choice of decision-makers and process, 
                                                                                                                                 
judges accustomed to formal rules and lawyers lacking arbitration advocacy training tend to 
conduct arbitration just like a court hearing. See, e.g., Hiro Naraindas Aragaki, Arbitration 
Reform in India: Challenges and Opportunities, in THE DEVELOPING WORLD OF 
ARBITRATION 221, 226–27, 242–43 (Anselmo Reyes & Weixia Gu eds.) (forthcoming 2018) 
(on file with author). 
56  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 408. 
57  Id. at 421. 
58  Id. at 386 (arguing that the “expansion of the scope of arbitration in each domain to dis-
putes the procedure arguably was not originally intended. . . .”). 
59  Id. at 423. 
60  Id. at 423–24. 
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and the lack of a standing body that ensures consistency and coherence in deci-
sions over time.61 By contrast, Hensler and Khatam draw this distinction at the 
level of particular procedures. For example, they believe that pre-trial discovery 
and appellate review are “more reflective of litigation norms than traditional 
arbitration procedures.”62 The implication is that they do not belong in arbitra-
tion. But how accurate are these assessments? Let’s look at specific examples. 
Take pre-trial discovery. Pre-trial discovery is certainly not “characteristic” 
of litigation63 especially if one considers the case of foreign and international 
courts, which are more relevant comparison groups vis-à-vis international 
commercial and investment arbitration. In most corners of the developed world, 
pre-trial discovery is viewed with a mixture of disdain and bewilderment as a 
distinctively American anomaly. If pre-trial discovery is either prohibited or 
non-existent in most courts around the world, it is difficult to appreciate how 
the increased use of discovery in ICA is a sign of arbitration’s judicialization as 
opposed, say, to its Americanization. 
Even within the United States, the liberal regime of pre-trial discovery en-
visioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a relatively recent devel-
opment. By and large, it did not exist in federal court litigation prior to the pas-
sage of the Federal Rules in 1938. Some states like California and New York 
did not adopt it until almost two decades later.64 Prior to this, therefore, it is no 
stretch to say that there was roughly the same amount of pre-trial discovery in 
arbitration as there was in litigation—namely, none. From this standpoint, its 
increased use in arbitration today could be seen as part of an overall shift in ad-
judication toward avoiding unfair surprise, adapting to the increasing complexi-
ty of modern disputes, or giving parties more discretion and control over fact-
finding, rather than as arbitration’s “re-invention” into a quintessentially court-
like process.65 
At the same time, discovery practice in arbitration is likely older than 
Hensler and Khatam suggest. By 1969, federal courts had begun considering 
whether, even in the absence of an express statutory provision, arbitrators could 
                                                        
61  See, e.g., Cesare PR Romano et al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Is-
sues, and Players, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 5, 10–11 
(Cesare PR Romano et al. eds., 2014). 
62  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 396. 
63  Id. at 411–12. 
64  See Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 91–92, 110 
(1960). 
65  It is true that the FAA, which was enacted in 1925, is silent on discovery. Yet it would be 
a mistake to infer from this silence that the FAA takes any normative position on arbitra-
tion’s compatibility with discovery. The most that can be inferred from this silence is that the 
FAA—no less than contemporaneous procedural codes and rules governing civil litigation 
until 1938—did not intend to take a position on liberal pre-trial discovery at all. See Hiro N. 
Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 158 (2016). 
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order discovery in the interest of a full and fair hearing.66 The issue was im-
portant enough that the Committee on Arbitration of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York released a report on the subject in 1978, in which it 
concluded that pre-trial discovery was not “incompatible with the fundamental 
purpose of arbitration” and recommended that the AAA rules be amended to 
provide for it.67 The upshot is that pre-trial discovery has not had a materially 
longer history of use in litigation (even though that use may have been more 
frequent and regular than in arbitration). 
Much the same can be said about published, reasoned awards. Hensler and 
Khatam make it sound as if every publicly adjudicated dispute ends with a rea-
soned judgment. But consider jury trials, often posited as the quintessential 
court-based alternative to arbitration (usually in order to emphasize the consti-
tutional and democratic values that are lost when cases are decided by private 
arbitrators).68 Jury trials produce yes/no verdicts that, as a rule, are never rea 
soned.69 As for the 99 percent of cases that are disposed of in other ways,70 
most are either privately settled, voluntarily dismissed, or disposed of on a mo-
                                                        
66  See, e.g., Chevron Transp. Corp. v. Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera, S.A., 300 F. 
Supp. 179, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (stating, in dictum, that arbitrators could order discovery 
in such circumstances). 
67  Comm. on Arb., The Use of Discovery in Arbitration, 33 ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 231, 231, 
234–35 (1978). Limited discovery became available as of right in securities arbitration by 
1987. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 n.18 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
68  Hensler, for instance, has argued that “[w]hatever else arbitration contracts achieve, they 
preclude plaintiffs from taking cases to juries, which many business decision makers believe 
are prejudiced against them.” Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
165, 184 (2003). 
69  John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 
856 (1985) (arguing that the “conclusory general verdict of a jury is the antithesis of a rea-
soned judgment; nor do we insist on much better in the realm of bench trials.”). As Alexan-
dra Lahav put it, 
In theory, judges could ask for publicly stated reasons from the jury, and the fact that we accept 
jury verdicts as legitimate, although they do not provide reasons, demonstrates that the idea that 
participation in adjudication requires public reason giving is not universal. Conversely, the lack 
of reasons accompanying jury verdicts may be one reason why there is so much criticism of the 
civil jury. 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 519 (2015). 
Reason-giving may not be all that much more common when it comes to bench trials either. 
See Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 45–46 (1995) (“What is astonishing . . . is that reasoned judgments in criminal bench 
trials appear to be the exception rather than the rule in the United States. . . . [M]any states 
do not provide for specific findings in nonjury criminal trials under any circumstances.”). 
70  See Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Ac-
tion Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2016, U.S. CTS, 
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c4_0331.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5QLZ-GU4F] (last visited Jan 23, 2018) (reporting that of 270,298 federal district court cas-
es terminated during the reporting period, 2,080 (0.8 percent) reached a jury trial). 
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tion. Only as to the last is there a possibility of a reasoned decision, and even 
here the chances of that happening are low—probably less than 30 percent.71 In 
civil law jurisdictions, reasoned judgments are strictly unnecessary because, 
unlike the judgment itself, the ratio decidendi does not have the force of law. 
Many European countries require their courts to give reasons nonetheless.72 
Ironically, this is more than what can be said of federal trial and appellate judg-
es in the United States, who actually have no positive legal obligation to pro-
vide reasons for their rulings73 and in this respect are no different from many 
(but not all) private arbitrators. France is an example of a civil law country that 
has taken pithiness in judicial writing to an extreme. Even the apex court, the 
cour de cassation, is known for issuing conclusory and extremely terse judg-
ments of one page or less74—that is, judgments whose form is scarcely distin-
guishable from that of a so-called “standard” (non-reasoned) arbitral award. 
True, France may be somewhat of an outlier in this respect, but the example 
goes to show that what we think of as a trademark of public adjudication will 
depend to a great deal on context.75 
                                                        
71  In their empirical study of 980 cases from four federal district courts, David Hoffman and 
his colleagues found that out of a total of 5,376 orders issued, which included everything 
from ministerial scheduling orders to orders granting summary judgment, only 178 or 3 per-
cent were in the form of a reasoned opinion. David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District 
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 709–10 (2007). Out of the approximately 
277 appealable, dispositive orders (such as orders granting summary judgment, post-trial 
motions), only approximately 75 (or 27 percent) resulted in a reasoned opinion. See id. at 
710, 713–15. At the case level, they found that judges from the Northern District of Califor-
nia averaged writing only one opinion for every 12.4 cases they handled and that in approx-
imately one half of the 980 cases in the study, judges issued no reasoned opinions whatsoev-
er. Id. at 710. 
72  See, e.g., Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], Dec. 5, 2005, § 286 
(Ger., amended July 18, 2017) (“In dem Urteil sind die Gründe anzugeben, die für die rich-
terliche Überzeugung leitend gewesen sind.”). 
73  The only exception is where the failure to give reasons would entirely frustrate review by 
a higher court. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A 
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 525–34 (2015). Nor is the failure 
to provide reasons reversible error. Id. at 533. And although some states require their appel-
late judges to provide reasons, Cohen argues there has historically been no such duty at 
common law. Id. at 525–27. 
74  MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS 30–34 (2004). 
75  Moreover, even in the case of France it would be incorrect to conclude that this one aspect 
of the judicial system—unreasoned judgments—reveals anything “characteristic” of this par-
ticular system. Common law lawyers have fallen into this trap when they take the absence of 
stated reasons in French court judgments as a sign that the French judiciary—or, worse, civil 
law systems more generally—is formalistic, authoritarian, or deductive to the core, and in 
this way essentially different from the more pragmatic, contextual, and policy-driven im-
pulses of common law systems. As Mitchell Lasser has gone to great lengths to explain, the-
se differences in the form of French and common law judgments are largely epiphenomenal 
because they conceal the important ways in which “serious, frank, long-term, informed, mul-
tifaceted, and explicitly substantive deliberation,” often in the form of lengthy written, rea-
soned analyses that are exchanged among decision-makers, does in fact pervade French judi-
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Now consider whether reasoned decisions are foreign to arbitration. A 
clear counterexample here is inter-state and investor-state arbitral tribunals, 
which are known for issuing lengthy and meticulously-reasoned awards that 
can span hundreds of pages.76 The PCA, which handles state-to-state, investor-
state, and ICA cases, has required arbitral awards to be accompanied by a 
statement of reasons since its founding in 1899.77 As far back as the turn of the 
century, some state arbitration statutes in the United States required arbitrators 
to “state the facts thus found and the conclusions of law separately.”78 Ameri-
can trade associations and chambers of commerce from the same period some-
times published reasoned arbitral awards even beyond their membership.79 For 
his part, Julius Henry Cohen—the mastermind behind the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)—argued that arbitral awards were valuable as “precedent for the 
future guidance of other arbitrators” and advocated the use of written, reasoned 
awards in complex cases.80 These longstanding norms and practices are perfect-
ly understandable given that arbitration is a type of adjudication, which Lon 
Fuller famously described as a process of proof and reason-giving.81 If Fuller is 
correct, it is difficult to appreciate how requiring arbitrators to record the rea-
sons for their awards amounts to the improper “blurring” of arbitration and 
public adjudication. 
                                                                                                                                 
cial decision-making and inform published judgments; it just occurs within institutional con-
fines and away from public view. Id. at 323–29. Much the same point can be made about 
arbitration vis-à-vis-litigation. That is, any difference in the reasoned character of arbitral 
awards and court judgments does not necessarily signify essential differences between the 
two forums. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
387 (1978) (arguing that the lack of reasoned awards in commercial arbitrations at the AAA 
does not undercut the reasoned character of arbitration qua adjudication). 
76  Awards issued in mixed claims commissions and other inter-state arbitration proceedings 
from the turn of the century were not materially shorter or less reasoned than opinions of the 
modern United States Supreme Court. Some awards were one hundred pages or more in 
length. See, e.g., Affaire des biens britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Spain v. U.K.), 2 
R.I.A.A. 615, 742 (Perm. Ct. Arb. May 1, 1925); Company General of the Orinoco Case (Fr. 
v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 184, 285 (Perm Ct. Arb. July 31, 1905). 
77  First Hague Convention, supra note 18, art. 52. 
78  Compare IOWA CODE § 12699 (1927) (“All the rules prescribed by law in cases of refer-
ees are applicable to arbitrators. . . .”), with id. § 11526 (“The report of the referee on the 
whole issue must state the facts thus found and the conclusions of the law separately. . . .”); 
compare NEB. REV. ST. § 9176 (1922) (“All the rules prescribed by law in cases of referees 
are applicable to arbitrators. . . .”), with id. § 8814 (“The trial before referees is conducted in 
the same manner as a trial by the court. . . . They must state the facts found and the conclu-
sions of law, separately, and their decision must be given, and may be excepted to and re-
viewed in like manner.”). But see McKnight v. McCullough, 21 Iowa 111, 114 (Iowa 1866) 
(“The law requires the arbitrators to make an award—not facts found and legal conclu-
sions.”). 
79  See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
80  See Julius Henry Cohen, Hand Book for Arbitrators, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
METHOD FOR THE ADJUSTMENT, WITHOUT LITIGATION, OF DIFFERENCES ARISING BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS, OR CORPORATIONS 52 (1911). 
81  See Fuller, supra note 75, at 363–72. 
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Let me make a brief note here about published decisions. It is generally 
true that there is no requirement to make arbitration awards publicly available, 
nor is there a right of public access to arbitration proceedings. But that is not 
the same as saying that arbitration is secret.82 In the absence of a nondisclosure 
agreement or a legal presumption of confidentiality,83 a party to an arbitration 
may publish any documents including the award. Even with a confidentiality 
agreement, those materials would be discoverable in litigation.84 By compari-
son, although court records are generally publicly available, it is not the norm 
to publish opinions and many United States courts actually have a presumption 
against it.85 For example, on average less than 20 percent of appellate opinions 
are published.86 The few studies of federal district court publication rates place 
the figure anywhere from 1.6 percent to 5.3 percent.87 That percentage will be 
even lower in state trial courts—responsible for the vast bulk of litigation in 
                                                        
82  See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1211, 1218–19 (2006). 
83  Such a presumption exists in some jurisdictions outside the US. E.g., Ali Shipping Corp. 
v. Shipyard Trogir (1998) 2 All ER 136 (K.B.). 
84  See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 425 
(2002). 
85  E.g., Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of 
“No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1054 n.105 
(2002) (“[N]early half of the federal appeals courts carry a presumption against the publica-
tion of opinions.”); Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publication 
Practices, 83 L. LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991). 
86  See Table B-12: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases 
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 
2016, U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R2LG-B6W7] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (reporting 11.3 percent publica-
tion rate across all circuit courts of appeal); JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 2016 COURT STATISTICS 
REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 27 (2016) (indicating that in 2014–15, only 9 per-
cent of California Appellate Court opinions were published); Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation 
of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 26 
(2005) (“Less than nineteen percent of the cases disposed of on the merits last year resulted 
in published opinions.”). 
87  See Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Re-
search Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 790 (1992); Allan D. Vestal, Publishing District Court 
Opinions in the 1970’s, 17 LOY. L. REV. 673, 683 tbl.2 (1971). Even when the sample is lim-
ited to determinations on the merits, the rate of publication is still surprisingly low. For ex-
ample, Brian Lizotte found that out of a random sample of 607 cases terminated by summary 
judgment in the year 2000, only 75 or 12 percent were published in a federal reporter and 
another 172 or 28 percent were made available via online databases such as LEXIS. See Bri-
an N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by 
Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 125–26, 130 (2007). The upshot is that the 
remaining 360 cases terminated by summary judgment were not published in any medium. 
David Hoffman and his colleagues isolated 1,091 substantive (i.e., non-ministerial) orders in 
a sample of district court cases and found that only 178 of them (or 16.3 percent) resulted in 
opinions that were made available on an electronic database (some likely with the designa-
tion “unpublished opinion”). Hoffman, supra note 71, at 720. 
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this country—because their opinions are rarely published at all.88 And when the 
inquiry is broadened to foreign trial courts, publicity may be an even less con-
sistent quality of public adjudication.89 
Consider, finally, the issue of appellate review. Hensler and Khatam take 
the proliferation of appellate arbitration rules and reports of an uptick in ap-
peals of arbitral awards as a sign that arbitration is increasingly crossing the 
line into public adjudication.90 The assumption must be that appellate review is 
either distinctive of courts or uncharacteristic of arbitration. Appellate review 
as we know it, however, was never a consistent staple of judicial procedure. In 
England, it was not until 1873 that the losing party to a suit at common law 
could appeal a question of fact.91 Federal criminal defendants in the United 
States could not appeal their convictions until at least 1889.92 Finally, the 
Court’s longstanding position has been that due process does not require a right 
of appeal at all.93 
It is also important to distinguish between two different types of appellate 
review: error correction, traditionally conceived as a private function, and law 
enunciation, traditionally conceived in more public terms.94 It is true that law 
enunciation has never been regarded as an important function of arbitral tribu-
nals, although as usual there are exceptions. For example, I know of at least one 
early twentieth century attempt in the United States to organize appellate arbi-
tral awards into a national system of commercial precedent that would “deter-
                                                        
88  See, e.g., Laura Denvir Stith, Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really 
Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743, 1755 n.39 (2009). 
89  For example, it has been reported that in Saudi Arabia, “courts are closed to everyone ex-
cept for the relevant parties to a dispute and their legal counsel,” that “disputes are resolved 
behind closed doors,” and that “judicial dockets and opinions are not published or made 
available to the public.” See Amgad Husein & Jonathan Burns, Choice of Forum in Con-
tracts with Saudi Arabian Counterparties: An Analysis of the DIFC Common Law Courts 
from a Saudi Arabian Perspective, 48 INT’L LAW. 179, 182 (2015). 
90  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 393, 399. 
91  Lord Justice Atkin, Appeal in English Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 2 (1927). Unlike the 
United States, where the best judicial talent and the most resources were invested in the ap-
pellate rather than in the trial ranks, English courts historically focused on getting things 
right at the trial level. Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. 
REV. 126, 128 (1926) (“The English instinct for judicial administration has always recog-
nized the trial, rather than the appeal, as the primary field of court operation.”). 
92  See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE 
L.J. 62, 62 n.4 (1985). At least as of the time Dalton wrote his article, criminal defendants in 
West Virginia had no automatic right to appeal their convictions—only a right to apply for 
the right to appeal. Id. at 62 n.2. 
93  Provided, of course, that due process rights were satisfied in the tribunal of first instance. 
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park 
Dist. for Summit Cty., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930). FAA section 10 likewise ensures that arbitra-
tions governed by the FAA meet minimum due process standards. See Edward Brunet, Arbi-
tration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 114–15 (1992). 
94  E.g., Michal Bobek, Quantity or Quality? Reassessing the Role of Supreme Jurisdictions 
in Central Europe, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 33, 40 (2009). 
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min[e] authoritatively trade custom as regards the particular issue[s] involved” 
and “prove [valuable] to the merchant facing situations similar to those adjudi-
cated by commercial bodies.”95 
By contrast, the examples that Hensler and Khatam provide all have to do 
with error correction. This is a decidedly private function that is not incon-
sistent with one of the purposes of arbitration, which was to avoid the problem 
that commercial cases were often incorrectly decided in court by untutored ju-
ries or because of procedural technicalities having nothing to do with the sub-
stantive merits.96 It is true that values such as finality and efficiency have gen-
erally militated in favor of narrowly limiting the grounds for correcting errors 
in arbitral awards. But it would be a stretch to infer from this that appellate re-
view qua error correction is so foreign to the idea of arbitration that it threatens 
something akin to a genetic modification of the process. For example, in the 
early twentieth century, common law and statutory arbitral awards were re-
viewable for mistakes of law in some United States states.97 Appellate arbitra-
tion boards were also a staple of certain trade association and chamber of 
                                                        
95  H. ARTHUR DUNN & HENRY P. DIMOND, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: BEING A 
COMPILATION OF AWARDS OF ARBITRATION COMMITTEES OF VARIOUS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS 
AND CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1922); cf. FRANCES KELLOR, 
ARBITRATION IN ACTION: A CODE FOR CIVIL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATIONS 
127 (1941) (explaining that because trade-association arbitrators are often called upon to “in-
terpret or apply the customs of a trade . . . [their decisions] are usually recorded and are 
placed at the disposal of subsequent arbitrators.”). Dunn and Dimond compiled reports of 
selected commercial arbitration decisions from various trade associations and chambers of 
commerce throughout the country and organized them by subject for “the establishment of a 
system of Reports of Commercial Arbitrations generally recognized and accepted as sound 
business doctrine by those engaged in commerce.” DUNN & DIMOND, Preface to 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra. This effort was likely unique to trade association arbitra-
tion boards and likely did not apply to other arbitral forums such as the American Arbitration 
Association, which reportedly “discourage[d] the use of precedent.” Soia Mentschikoff, 
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 857 (1961). 
96  See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1939, 1973–86 (2014). 
97  E.g., ALA. CODE § 6170 (1928) (providing a right to appeal arbitral awards to the court of 
appeal or the supreme court); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4299 (1928) (providing that parties may 
agree to appeal arbitral awards to the superior court); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5602 (1922) (“Pro-
vided, [t]hat either party to the contentions shall have the right of appeal to the Circuit Court 
by serving written notice upon the opposite party within five days after the finding of said 
arbitration, setting forth the grounds of said appeal. And on such appeal the Circuit Judge 
presiding in said Court shall hear said appeal as to all questions of law and fact. . . .”); TEX. 
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 233–34 (1925) (providing that parties may agree to appeal arbitral 
awards to the trial court); cf. 5 CORPUS JURIS 183 (William Mack & William Benjamin Hale 
eds., 1916) (“Whenever the arbitrators are required, by the terms of the submission or by a 
statute or rule of court under which the arbitration proceeds, to determine the rights of the 
parties according to law, a plain mistake in their construction of the law is sufficient ground 
upon which to avoid the award.”). 
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commerce arbitration programs.98 And although it did not specifically provide 
for the appeal of arbitral awards, the English Arbitration Act of 1889—which 
became a model for arbitration legislation in most crown colonies from Gibral-
tar to India to Australia99—enabled arbitrators to refer legal questions for judi-
cial determination and was interpreted to empower English courts to remit arbi-
tral awards for any clear error of law “appear[ing] on the face of the award.”100 
B. Do Some Procedures Defeat the Original Intent of Arbitration? 
Hensler and Khatam could retort that even if these procedural trappings 
had a longer history in arbitration than we thought, it still wouldn’t change their 
normative contention that these things never belonged in arbitration in the first 
place. Why? Because they all tend to make arbitration “time-consuming, ex-
pensive, and procedurally rigid,” whereas arbitration’s original purpose was to 
be “an inexpensive . . . efficient, and final means of resolving commercial dis-
putes.”101 In other words, they turn arbitration into something it was never sup-
posed to be, something contrary to its very nature.102 
Although much has been said about the importance of speed and economy 
in arbitration, it would be incorrect to reduce arbitration to these values 
                                                        
98  Judging from the many extant reports of such appellate arbitral tribunals the process ap-
pears to have been used with some frequency. See, e.g., Grain Dealers National Association 
Arbitration Rules, in DANIEL BLOOMFIELD, SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 105, 108–09 (1927); DUNN & DIMOND, supra note 95, at 275–76, 279–80, 
283–84, 286–90, 295, 304, 306 (setting forth appellate rules of the Chicago and New Orleans 
Boards of Trade, among several others). As one commentator at the time put it, “[o]ne is 
immediately struck in examining the trade association rules by the large number providing 
for an appeal after an arbitrator’s decision to another board of arbitration.” Philip G. Phillips, 
Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 623 
(1934). Appellate procedures in trade association arbitration appear to have been common in 
England as well. See G. Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
656, 671–75 (1952) (noting that some trade associations provided for not one but two tiers of 
appellate review). 
99  See Arbitration Act 1895, No. 1895-10 (Gib.); An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Ar-
bitration, No. 9 of 1899, INDIA CODE (1899); Arbitration Act 1902 (NSW) (Austl.). 
100  Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan Gov’t. [1924] AC 797 (HL) 819 (appeal taken from 
Eng.); Arbitration Act 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49 §§ 7, 10 (Eng.). International tribunals have 
likewise combined appellate judicial review (in both its error correction and law enunciation 
forms) with first-tier adjudication in arbitral forums. For example, since its inception the 
OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, a standing judicial appellate body, has 
had the power to review the awards of ad hoc arbitral panels to ensure uniform interpretation 
regional commercial laws. Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa art. 21, 
Oct. 17, 1993, Org. for the Harmonization of Bus. L. Africa J. Officiel no 4 du 01/11/1997. 
The WTO likewise involves first-tier decision-making by ad hoc arbitral tribunals, followed 
by review of the same by the WTO Appellate Body, which is the equivalent of an interna-
tional court. 
101  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 389, 407. 
102  See id. at 381. 
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alone.103 Early twentieth century United States arbitration supporters did not 
regard efficiency as an end in itself, to be pursued at all costs regardless of the 
impact on process or outcomes.104 Instead, they also saw them as a means to 
combat the unfairness and injustice that litigants routinely seemed to face in 
court. The oft-repeated refrain about courtroom litigation circa 1900 was “jus-
tice delayed is justice denied.”105 That is, when it took not years but decades for 
a court to resolve a simple case of breach of contract,106 the problem was not 
one of lost efficiencies but rather one of lost rights: witnesses forgot details, 
crucial evidence disappeared, real parties in interest died.107 Likewise, there 
were widespread complaints at the turn of the century that court cases were 
won or lost not on the merits but rather based on which party had “the longest 
purse.”108 Many small businesses and individuals with limited resources found 
themselves with little choice but to settle valid claims rather than vindicate 
them in court.109 Arbitration was supposed to be economical not just in order to 
attract bottom-line-oriented disputants, but also to avoid the problem of wealth 
discrepancies skewing adjudication in arbitrary ways. 
If this is correct, the mere fact that arbitration is getting more expensive or 
time consuming is not a problem per se. As Hensler and Khatam already appre-
ciate, to some degree this is to be expected given the increasing complexity of 
commercial transactions and their legal-regulatory framework.110 As long as 
what we lose in terms of speed or economy is outweighed by what we gain in 
terms of other arbitration values such as accuracy, legitimacy, or an improve-
ment in the administration of justice,111 it is difficult to see how arbitration’s 
reinvention is a problem rather than a potential solution. Even when it comes to 
courts, the pursuit of accurate decision-making on the merits has never been 
unqualified. Efficiency has always been an important value and is evident in 
doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel.112 If litigation cannot be 
                                                        
103  As I have argued elsewhere, this is a common move made by supporters and detractors of 
arbitration alike. See generally Aragaki, supra note 65. 
104  Id. at 152–55. If that were their true goal, the arbitration reformers could have advocated 
for all disputes to be settled by the toss of a coin. Instead, from what I can tell they had the 
highest regard for due process and substantive fairness in arbitration. Aragaki, supra note 96, 
at 1980–84. 
105  E.g., William L. Ransom, The Organization of the Courts for the Better Administration 
of Justice, 2 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 272–73 (1917) (emphasis added). 
106  For examples, see Aragaki, supra note 96, at 1968–69. 
107  See Aragaki, supra note 65, at 154. 
108  E.g., MOORFIELD STOREY, THE REFORM OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 4 (1911). 
109  E.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906). 
110  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 421. 
111  For a more detailed discussion of the importance of this last value for the arbitration re-
form movement that led to the FAA, see Aragaki, supra note 96, at 1973–87, 2000–02. 
112  E.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. 
L. REV. 319, 332–34 (2008); Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Fed-
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reduced to the untrammeled pursuit of justice, neither should arbitration be re-
duced to the blinkered pursuit of speed and economy. 
C. The Virtues of Hybridization 
At what point when we incorporate more and more of these procedures do 
we fail to preserve the essential “differences between arbitration . . . and litiga-
tion”113 such that we risk “destroy[ing]”114 both? The authors’ argument begs 
this type of question aimed at settling once and for all the boundary between 
“private” and “public” adjudication. It’s an alluring set of questions that ap-
peals to the academic in me. But it is less helpful to the legal reformer in me, 
because even if we could all agree on where that line is as a metaphysical mat-
ter it is unclear that crossing it is to be avoided as a normative one. 
Consider that the history of Anglo-American civil procedure has been a se-
ries of experiments in blurring boundaries—not always successfully—between 
supposedly distinct dispute resolution forums. In eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century England, Chancery routinely referred cases that required sophis-
ticated fact-finding to arbitral tribunals.115 American equity courts eventually 
abandoned the ancient tradition of a secret, documents-based procedure and 
began receiving oral testimony in open court.116 The New York Field Code and 
the English Judicature Act of 1873 effectively collapsed the centuries-old seg-
regation of law and equity, bringing them both under one roof.117 Revolutionary 
reforms to English civil procedure, including the creation of the Commercial 
Court of the King’s Bench in the nineteenth century, were unabashedly de-
scribed as based on the “central principle of commercial arbitration.”118 And as 
I have elsewhere argued, our current Federal Rules regime was itself greatly 
inspired by the model of arbitration—in particular its procedural simplicity, ef-
ficiency, and ability to cut through technicalities to reach a decision on the mer-
its—in ways hitherto underappreciated.119 If my argument is correct, American 
civil procedure today is in many ways the product of litigation’s reinvention in 
arbitration’s image. 
                                                                                                                                 
eral Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 302 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 243–47 (2004). 
113  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 422. 
114  Id. at 386. 
115  James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment 
Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1033–36 (2010). 
116  Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1224–38 (2005). 
117  See An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the 
Courts of this State, ch. 379 1848 N.Y. Laws 164; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 
& 37 Vict. c. 66 (Eng.). 
118  See ROSENBAUM, supra note 38, at 48–50. 
119  See generally Aragaki, supra note 96. 
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Unlike Hensler and Khatam, therefore, I would like to take a stance in fa-
vor of arbitration’s reinvention. To me, reinvention is the stuff of progress be-
cause real progress always requires a radical departure from the status quo. 
Think of it: human evolution happened only because amphibians ventured on 
land; modern democracies did not blossom until the divine authority of kings 
dared to be questioned; women’s suffrage become a reality only because wom-
en refused to accept the way things always were. 
In like manner, some of the most innovative and exciting developments in 
dispute resolution have been born of hybridization and cross-pollination be-
tween arbitration and litigation. We already considered the IUSCT, which is 
typically understood as an arbitral forum even though some regard it as a court 
or a claims commission.120 Another example is the ICJ’s Ad Hoc Chambers 
procedure,121 which has been analogized to arbitration because it gives parties 
greater control over the composition of the tribunal.122 Although the ICJ has a 
standing body of fifteen members who typically sit as a full bench, the Cham-
bers process gives parties broad discretion to choose a smaller subset of mem-
bers and even non-members to decide their dispute. Chambers judgments, how-
ever, are treated like any judgment of the full court and must be published. 
New commercial courts in jurisdictions from Abu Dhabi to Singapore are 
also combining the “best of international commercial arbitration” with judicial 
procedure.123 For example, the Singapore International Commercial Court 
(SICC) was created in part to address some of the criticisms of arbitration dis-
cussed by Hensler and Khatam. But even though it is a part of the Singapore 
judiciary, it is still heavily influenced by arbitral practice and procedure: The 
parties may opt out of the Singapore Rules of Evidence.124 The court makes use 
of “international judges”—independent contractors who are neither Singapore-
an citizens nor full time employees of the court and therefore not publicly ac-
                                                        
120  See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text; Jan Klabbers, The EJIL Foreword: The 
Transformation of International Organizations Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 58 (2015) (refer-
ring to the IUSCT as a “semi-permanent international judicial entity”); David D Caron, In-
ternational Claims and Compensation Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 283, 286 (Cesare PR Romano et al. eds., 2014) (describing 
the IUSCT as a “claims commission”). 
121  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 26 ¶ 2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993; Rules of Court art. 17, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 
122  See Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81 
AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 843 (1987). Although most commentators would insist that the Cham-
bers process is still judicial, others have taken the position that it is an even clearer example 
of arbitration than the IUSCT. E.g., John C. Guilds, III, “If It Quacks Like a Duck”: Com-
paring the ICJ Chambers to International Arbitration for a Mechanism of Enforcement, 16 
MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 43, 43, 81 (1992). 
123  See Firew Tiba, The Emergence of Hybrid International Commercial Courts and the Fu-
ture of Cross Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in Asia, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 
31, 32 (2016). 
124  Supreme Court of Judicature Act 2014, c. 322, § 80, O. 110, r. 23(1) (Sing.). 
18 NEV. L.J. 541, ARAGAKI - FINAL 3/29/18  11:03 AM 
Winter 2018] METAPHYSICS OF ARBITRATION 565 
countable in quite the same way as their domestic counterparts.125 And the en-
tire proceedings (including the docket and all filings) may be closed to the pub-
lic at the request of one party.126 
Are these examples of “arbitration” or “courts”? Does it matter, especially 
if they are meeting the evolving needs of end-users while addressing perceived 
shortcomings of existing dispute resolution options? What these innovations all 
have in common is that they don’t think of it as an either/or choice between 
public and private adjudication; instead, they think of dispute resolution holisti-
cally, all the while borrowing one device from one process and glomming it on 
to another without so much as an afterthought. At the end of the day these initi-
atives in state-to-state and international commercial adjudication have managed 
to provide creative and workable options for increasingly complex problems. 
There is no reason why they cannot serve as precedents for similar reforms in 
investor-state, ICA, and domestic United States arbitration. 
III. FITTING THE FORUM TO THE FUSS 
At this point it may be helpful to recap the two basic problems thematized 
by Hensler and Khatam’s paper. The first has to do with the expanding scope of 
arbitrability—that is, the increasing influx of public disputes into arbitral fo-
rums.127 This is most evident in the domestic United States context,128 so it is to 
this context that I shall confine my remarks in this Part. The second has to do 
                                                        
125  See SINGAPORE [CONSTITUTION], Dec. 22, 1965, S 1/63, art. 95(4)(c) (Sing.). A similar 
practice of using international judges exists in the Gulf region. See, e.g., Dubai International 
Financial Centre Court Law No. 10 of 2004, § 9(3). 
126  Supreme Court of Judicature Act 2014, c. 322, § 80, O. 110, r. 30(1) (Sing.). Although 
final judgments must be published, parties may request that sensitive information be redact-
ed and, to the extent redaction is impossible, the SICC may postpone publication for up to 
ten years. Id. 
127  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 420 (describing the “expansion in substantive 
scope, from a relatively narrow and homogeneous set of private nature disputes, to a more 
broad and diverse set of disputes with significant public policy implications”). 
128  It is least evident in ICA. The authors seem to acknowledge this when they observe that 
“[c]ontroversy in the international commercial arbitration domain focuses on practice rather 
than on jurisprudence,” by which they mean things like the increasing time and expense of 
arbitration rather than the influx of public claims. Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 384. 
This is consistent with the fact that pre-dispute arbitration clauses are highly regulated in 
some countries. See, e.g., Philippe Fouchard, La Laborieuse Réforme de la Clause Com-
promissoire Par La Loi Du 15 Mai 2001, 2001 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 397, 413–14; Coun-
cil Directive 93/13/EEC art. 6, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC) (“Member States shall lay down 
that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, 
as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer . . .”); annex, 1993 
O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC) (defining as “unfair” terms that “exclud[e] or hinder[] the consumer’s 
right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the 
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly 
restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, ac-
cording to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract”). 
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with reinvention, which is related but slightly different. Reinvention according 
to the authors (and as discussed above) does not consist in the bare fact that 
public claims are increasingly coming to be adjudicated in arbitration, for that 
would make it the same as the expansion of arbitrability. Instead, it is that the 
arbitration process has transformed in order to better accommodate this phe-
nomenon.129 
The second problem helps shore up an immediate lacuna in the first. Con-
sider that expanding arbitrability would be far more problematic if arbitration 
procedure had remained frozen in time. But by the authors’ own account, this is 
not what has happened: Due process protocols, publication and transparency 
requirements, and formal rules have gradually been incorporated into the arbi-
tral process. If so, why is it a problem anymore? The reinvention thesis meets 
this challenge by contending that arbitration’s transformation in these ways is a 
priori incapable of curing the problem—for example, because in doing so it 
ends up altogether defeating the very purpose of arbitration. 
Because of the reservations I expressed in Part II, I am concerned that the 
reinvention thesis ends up shifting precious attention away from (and ultimately 
adds little to) what I regard as the more compelling problem: the troubling ex-
pansion of arbitrability. I think this problem is also closer to the authors’ deeper 
interests, since their stated goal is not to rectify what they see as arbitration’s 
structural transmogrification toward litigation; instead, it is to “more carefully 
analyze what disputes are most appropriately assigned to private and public 
procedures.”130 I take this to mean that the authors would be satisfied if a well-
defined category of “public” claims were removed from the domain of “pri-
vate” tribunals regardless of whether those private tribunals remained formal, 
complex, or encumbered with the accoutrements of litigation. And if so, it 
might be possible to relax or even jettison the reinvention thesis while still pur-
suing the authors’ ultimate aims. 
Those aims are important and deserve serious consideration by critics and 
supporters of arbitration alike. They also implicate a central preoccupation of 
ADR theory since Frank Sander’s famous remarks at the 1976 Pound Confer-
ence.131 There, Sander argued that litigation is not necessarily the best means of 
dispute resolution for the needs of every dispute and disputant; thus, some ef-
fort should be made to match those needs with more appropriate procedures—
                                                        
129  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 420 (describing “the transformation of the procedure 
itself from an informal, streamlined, and highly private process, to a process resembling a 
public adjudicative forum”). 
130  Id. at 386; see also Deborah R. Hensler, The Private in Public, the Public in Private: The 
Blurring Boundary between Public and Private Dispute Resolution (2014), in 
FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 68 (Joachim Zekoll et al. 
eds., 2014). 
131  I am indebted to Jean Sternlight for bringing this to my attention. 
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an idea Sander would eventually coin as “fitting the forum to the fuss.”132 In 
this Part, I take up what strikes me as one of the most important questions 
raised by Hensler and Khatam’s paper: What disputes should not be arbitrated 
and why? 
To begin, let me clarify something about what Hensler and Khatam refer to 
as a “public” dispute. The public nature of a claim has traditionally consisted in 
whether it was brought by or against the state, such as a criminal charge or an 
action to declare a state law unconstitutional.133 For good reasons, however, 
such claims are not arbitrable. The same is largely true of many in rem claims 
and claims whose resolution would affect the rights of third parties.134 But be-
cause there is no credible expansion of arbitrability into these domains, these 
cannot be the type of disputes that Hensler and Khatam have in mind. Instead, 
what the authors think of as public disputes are really private disputes “with 
significant public policy dimensions”—for example, employment discrimina-
tion or consumer protection claims in which the public arguably has a height-
ened interest.135 
I agree in principle with the position that certain claims do not belong in 
domestic United States arbitration today. I have argued, for instance, that cer-
tain remedies such as public injunctions are not appropriately decided in arbi-
tration.136 The real point of difference between me and the authors is why. 
Hensler and Khatam appear prepared to resolve the question of how to “fit the 
forum to the fuss” based solely on whether a dispute counts as “public,” for 
which they believe the essentially private nature of arbitration is a poor fit. But 
the category “public dispute” is no less stable than the category “arbitration,”137 
                                                        
132  See generally Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: 
A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994). See Frank 
E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Before the National Conference on 
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7–9, 1976), 
in F.R.D. 111, 130–31 (1976). 
133  Thus, when Bell wrote in 1877 that “private parties could not dispose of the public inter-
est by any [arbitration] deed of theirs,” he was referring not to private claims that had a pub-
lic character but rather to that quintessential form of a public claim: the criminal charge. 
JOHN MONTGOMERIE BELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND 121–22 (2d 
ed. 1877). 
134  Thus, some so-called “core” bankruptcy proceedings have been held non-arbitrable, as 
have child custody disputes. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 23:4 
(2017) (explaining, inter alia, that a determination of discharge “constitutes a public rights 
dispute” that cannot be resolved in arbitration); Toiberman v. Tisera, 998 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (voiding agreement to arbitrate child custody dispute); Myers v. Parks, 
855 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (same); Fawzy v. Fawzy, 948 A.2d 709, 712 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (same). 
135  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 386. 
136  Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1250 
(2011). 
137  For example, Hensler and Khatam assume that disputes between “commercial partners 
over contract terms and performance” fall into the “private” side of the ledger. Hensler & 
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which is why I do not believe it is especially helpful to label certain things 
“public” or “private” and to make determinations based on those labels. In-
stead, I prefer to look at particulars: I would like to know, for instance, precise-
ly how the features of a given arbitration procedure (whether reinvented or not) 
are inadequate for a particular dispute or category of dispute and, if they are, 
whether legal, private governance, or practice-based reforms to that procedure 
could be implemented before we throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
Let me give an example from my own personal experience. I have handled 
several consumer cases as an AAA arbitrator and, as might be expected, there 
is a great diversity in the nature of the claims asserted. I have had cases involv-
ing pro se consumer claimants in which the type of due process protections to 
which Hensler and Khatam refer become all the more important. I have also ad-
judicated statutory claims where the consumer’s representative was just as so-
phisticated (or more so) than the respondent’s.138 None of these cases raised 
novel legal questions for which new precedents need to be created. The arbitra-
tion agreements generally do not contain a confidentiality clause, so the public 
can still learn about any alleged wrongdoing, as well as the details of what tran-
spired at the evidentiary hearing, as long as the consumer is willing to speak 
about it. The existence of a class waiver notwithstanding, consumers in these 
cases still manage to have their claims heard on the merits in part because statu-
tory fee shifting provisions make such cases quite lucrative for lawyers and the 
provider of goods or services almost always agrees to pay all arbitration costs 
in non-frivolous matters.139 
All of these cases are statutory consumer protection disputes and thus pre-
sumably count as “public” according to Hensler and Khatam. But they do not 
all affect the public interest in the same way. Given this, what do we lose by 
having some of them decided in arbitration? And is that better or worse than 
having all of them adjudicated in court? Ironically, it might be better for pro se 
consumer cases to remain in arbitration. Judge Richard Posner recently lament-
                                                                                                                                 
Khatam, supra note 2, at 393. But even those who would agree with their overall argument 
could disagree that such disputes are, in fact, private. Like Hensler and Khatam, Heinrich 
Kronstein argued over sixty years ago that as an essentially “private” forum, arbitration 
should be limited to private disputes. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration–Instrument of 
Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36, 39–40 (1944). But the similarity ends there, since 
Kronstein argued that this meant arbitration was not appropriate for disputes even over a 
shareholder agreement involving only three shareholders. This is because “creditors, repre-
senting the public, have an inherent interest in any transaction governing the conduct of a 
corporation.” Id. at 61. Yet surely not even Hensler and Khatam would go this far. 
138  The most common type of consumer dispute I have seen is where the consumer is the one 
being sued, often by small businesses or solo practitioners, for recovery of sums due (some 
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars). In a large portion of those cases, the debts are me-
ticulously documented and the consumer fails even to appear. 
139  The lawyers’ fees typically vastly exceed the consumer’s claim for damages, usually on 
the order of ten to one. For example, in cases where the consumer prevails on a claim of 
$10,000 or less, the attorneys’ fees typically approach or exceed $100,000. 
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ed that courts treat pro se parties unfairly—for example, by frequently dismiss-
ing their cases on technical grounds and assigning their appeals to staff lawyers 
rather than judges.140 By contrast, the relative lack of formal rules in arbitra-
tion—typically cited as a reason why arbitration fails to safeguard the rights of 
the “little guy”—gives arbitrators the power to cut through technicalities and 
the letter of the law in order to help untutored litigants get their real grievances 
heard on the merits.141 
Another consideration is that we typically know very little about whether a 
claim has “significant public policy dimensions” until it is already too late to 
ask whether it belongs in court or in arbitration. This is because, at the time one 
party moves to compel arbitration, all we have are bare allegations. Wittingly 
or not, a plaintiff can lead us to categorize what would otherwise be a run-of-
the-mill wrongful termination case as an age discrimination claim just by dress-
ing up his or her complaint. Thus, even if we could agree as a theoretical matter 
on where to draw the line between truly “public” and routine employment dis-
putes, in actuality the sorting process will be over and under-inclusive because 
in some cases the allegations in the complaint will not accurately capture the 
gravamen of the claim. Moreover, the strongest of those claims will likely nev-
er see a jury trial anyhow, much less extensive pre-trial discovery. Why? Be-
cause where liability is clear, both parties are likely to make similar assess-
ments of the outcome. The standard economic model would therefore predict 
that they are more likely to settle in order to avoid the transaction costs of liti-
gation.142 It’s the mediocre—or, depending on one’s perspective, “pathologi-
cal”143—cases that make up the bulk of disputes that proceed to trial. If our aim 
is to bring truly egregious corporate wrongdoing to light, therefore, removing 
those cases from arbitration may not be all that effective. 
                                                        
140  Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-
retirement.html [https://perma.cc/AT27-PZNQ]. 
141  At least one study found that arbitrators do this with some regularity in the securities con-
text, where the law’s rigid and complex requirements can make it difficult for plaintiffs with 
morally compelling cases to prevail in court. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up 
as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 
1039 (2002) (arguing that investors may fare worse in court than in arbitration given the dif-
ficulties of proof, the likelihood that a judge will apply strict pleading requirements, or simp-
ly because “customers’ complaints are frequently stronger on the equities . . . while the bro-
kers’ defenses are stronger on the law”). 
142  George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 17 (1984). Other models predict that cases selected for trial will disproportionately 
favor repeat players and parties with more information. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case 
Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 37 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996); James D. Miller, Us-
ing Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 72 
(1997). 
143  K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 62 (1960). 
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Moreover, the public or private nature of the claim is not the only relevant 
factor. Consent is another. Consider for a moment the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(AFA), which has been pending in one form or another in Congress since at 
least 2007.144 The AFA proposes to make pre-dispute arbitration clauses in-
volving employees, consumers, or civil rights claims unenforceable under the 
FAA for many of the same reasons identified by Hensler and Khatam. It does 
not however affect post-dispute submission agreements, which is to say that an 
employer and employee would remain free to agree to binding arbitration as 
long as they do so after the dispute has arisen. But a post-dispute submission to 
arbitration would still seem to pose the same problem underscored by Hensler 
and Khatam—namely, issues with significant public policy dimensions being 
resolved by a decision-maker who is a private citizen, possibly without discov-
ery or meaningful appellate review, in a closed-door process that results in an 
unpublished award. Most critics, however, find this unproblematic. For if 
American litigants have for the longest time had the greater power to remove 
disputes from the public domain by settling them directly, why shouldn’t they 
have the lesser power to settle them by use of a third-party arbitrator? Unless 
we are prepared to deny parties the right to settle disputes in which the public 
has a significant interest, we must accept the fact that consent—the knowing, 
informed, post hoc kind—is generally deemed sufficient to trump the public 
nature of a claim. 
Hensler’s own substantial and path-breaking work on mandatory court-
annexed arbitration confirms as much. Many such now-defunct court programs 
required certain types of disputes that Hensler and Khatam would describe as 
“public” to be heard by practicing lawyers or retired judges who conducted 
proceedings that were never open to the public and who generally did not pro-
vide published reasons for their decisions—in other words, classic private arbi-
tration before its “re-invention.”145 This included consumer cases, civil rights 
cases, and claims under protective federal statutes such as the Longshoremen & 
Harbor Worker’s Act and the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.146 Some of the-
                                                        
144  The most recent iteration is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017. See S. 537, 115th Cong. 
(2017); H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017). 
145  Deborah R. Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
399, 401 (1990) [hereinafter Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration]; see also Deborah R. 
Hensler, What We Know and Don’t Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 
JUDICATURE 1 (1986). The only difference was that the courts exercised oversight over these 
programs. This may be a material difference compared with ad hoc arbitration, but query 
whether the same is true of arbitrations administered by institutions such as the AAA. 
146  BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUD. CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN 
DISTRICT COURTS 9 (1990). The types of cases typically excluded from such programs in-
cluded prisoner cases, administrative appeals, tax and other more traditionally “public” cases 
that are not relevant to the authors’ argument because there is no known expansion of arbi-
tration into these areas. In some programs, however, “civil rights” cases were excluded. See 
id. Here it might be retorted that many disputes that Hensler and Khatam would consider 
public, such as employment discrimination claims, would have been automatically excluded 
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se cases were substantial, since in federal courts the upper jurisdictional limit 
was $150,000 in 1988 ($313,000 in 2017 dollars).147 What made court-annexed 
arbitration largely unobjectionable to Hensler was the fact that parties retained 
the right to reject the arbitral award and request a trial de novo in court.148 Even 
though they had no say in whether to participate in the process, in other words, 
they had to agree post hoc to the final award. 
Indeed, Hensler argued that such programs actually added value because 
the cases diverted to arbitration were overwhelmingly likely to settle rather 
than go before a jury. This meant that the programs afforded litigants a real 
shot at getting something they were unlikely to get in court: a hearing on the 
merits relatively early in the case (albeit in arbitration). Here, then, is another 
crosscutting consideration: If some cases that would count as “public” are es-
pecially prone to informal bargaining if left in court, perhaps they would be 
better off in arbitration—even the binding kind—where they would at least get 
adjudicated by well-trained arbitrators who understand the law, in a “reinvent-
ed” process that provides many of the procedural safeguards we have come to 
expect in such cases. 
A final problem with drawing lines purely based on the public or private 
nature of a claim is that it leaves Hensler and Khatam susceptible to the coun-
ter-critique that, just as some public claims do not belong in arbitration, some 
private claims may not belong in court. That is, if a dispute truly has no “signif-
icant public policy dimensions,” such as Hensler and Khatam’s example of a 
simple breach of contract dispute between two businesses,149 is it not in some 
respect a waste of precious judicial resources, tax dollars, and juror time to 
have them adjudicated in a public forum? Obvious Article III and state consti-
tutional concerns aside, there is at least a colorable public policy argument to 
be made that it is. Owen Fiss made just such an argument when he suggested 
that in cases where “only the interests and behavior of the immediate parties to 
the dispute are at issue,” it would be an “extravagant use of public resources” 
for them to be adjudicated in court.150 He concluded that “it seems quite appro-
                                                                                                                                 
from such programs because they were non-arbitrable under pre-Gilmer U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent in force at the time. But this overlooks the fact that Gilmer, McMahon, and similar 
cases responsible for the expansion of arbitrability into federal statutory claims were all FAA 
cases. The core logic of those cases was that there was no inherent conflict between the rele-
vant federal statute and the FAA because there was no per se reason why arbitration was un-
suitable to hear claims brought under them. The FAA does not apply to mandatory court-
annexed mediation programs because there is no voluntary arbitration agreement. 
147  See MEIERHOEFER, supra note 146, at 32–33. The majority of cases actually selected for 
arbitration were likely of a much lower dollar value, however. Id. at 45. 
148  E.g., Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration, supra note 145, at 401 (describing mandatory 
arbitration as “differ[ing] significantly” from private arbitration because the latter “produces 
a binding outcome that the parties have a contractual obligation to accept”). 
149  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 2, at 393 (referring to disputes “between commercial 
partners over contract terms and performance”). 
150  Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). 
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priate for those disputes to be handled . . . by arbitrators” and that courts may 
even be justified in mandating arbitration for this reason.151 
CONCLUSION 
Hensler and Khatam have done us a tremendous service by posing difficult 
questions with a breadth of vision that is both unique and refreshing. They have 
moreover brought together arbitration scholars in different fields, some work-
ing in blissful ignorance of one another, and for that I am grateful. 
My chief concern is that, in the course of making their otherwise compel-
ling arguments, Hensler and Khatam have managed to entangle themselves in 
what I am calling the metaphysics of arbitration. The risk here is that while this 
may help fuel the authors’ arguments, it may be used equally well in ways the 
authors would find troubling. For example, the Court has recently made similar 
metaphysical claims in order to force consumers to arbitrate on an individual 
basis, thus making it more difficult to bring class actions in arbitration. A case 
in point is AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,152 where the Court held that the FAA 
pre-empted a state law that invalidated class arbitration waivers. The rationale 
was that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation,” 
that “[a]rbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant pro-
cedural aspects of [class] certification” and thus cannot be trusted with ruling 
on them, and that the class mechanism “interferes with fundamental attributes 
of arbitration.”153 
I would have liked the Court to embrace rather than reject the idea of class 
arbitration, just as I would have liked to see Hensler and Khatam embrace ra-
ther than reject arbitration’s reinvention. In both cases, I hold metaphysics part-
ly responsible. After all, metaphysics seeks to capture the way the world is, and 
focusing on the way things are can lead us to believe that they are that way for 
a reason. Differences, limits, and the status quo can come to be explained in 
terms of necessity or destiny, which in turn can hinder us from imagining how 
things could be otherwise. 
By contrast, I am interested in the way the world could be. I would dare to 
know how arbitration can evolve in new and unexpected ways to meet the chal-
lenges of future generations. And so it is that I celebrate arbitration’s reinven-
tion. 
                                                        
151  Id. 
152  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
153  Id. at 344, 348, 350. Likewise, in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 
the Court held that an arbitration clause that is silent about the availability of class-wide re-
lief must be construed as prohibiting it, since class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitra-
tion to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agree-
ing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010). 
